Josephine Guion v. Bonner Homeless Transitions;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPHINE GUION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BONNER HOMELESS TRANSITIONS; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-35378
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00186-DCN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 8, 2021**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Josephine Guion appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her action alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”) and state law tort claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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judgment. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957,
970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on
Guion’s FHA claims because Guion failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants’ actions were discriminatory. See Walker v. City of
Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001) (elements of a retaliation claim
under the FHA); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (elements
of a disparate treatment claim); Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d
739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996) (elements of a disparate impact claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on
Guion’s state law fraud claim because Guion failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the statements made by defendants were false. See Faw
v. Greenwood, 613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Idaho 1980) (elements of a fraud claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on
Guion’s state law defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) claims because these claims are time-barred and Guion failed to show
extraordinary circumstances beyond her control that justified equitable tolling. See
Idaho Code § 5-219(4)-(5) (statute of limitations for defamation and IIED claims is
two years); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
equitable tolling is warranted “when extraordinary circumstances beyond the

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plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time”).
We reject as without merit Guion’s contentions that the district court judge
was biased against her and that she was denied due process.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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