Oscar Armando Amaya v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OSCAR ARMANDO AMAYA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72745
Agency No. A099-537-014
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted August 30, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Oscar Amaya (Amaya), a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks
review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying him
relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Amaya alleges that he fears
returning to El Salvador because (1) he cooperated with police against gang
FILED
SEP 15 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

-- 1 of 3 --

members who killed his brother in his presence, and (2) he has Norteños gang
tattoos that may lead to violence from other gangs and persecution from the
Salvadoran government.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Amaya did
not suffer past torture. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th
Cir. 2020) (reviewing for substantial evidence factual findings underlying the
BIA’s determination of ineligibility for CAT relief). The record does not reflect
that members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang (MS-13) intended to specifically
torture Amaya. See Eneh v. Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that “a petitioner must show for purposes of CAT relief that someone—either a
government official or private actor—specifically intended to torture him or her”)
(citation omitted); see also Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that “[a]cts that merely have the foreseeable result of inflicting harm
are not sufficient” to show specific intent to torture).
2. Absent the inference that stems from a finding of past torture, the
evidence does not compel the conclusion that Amaya faces a “likelihood of future
torture” if removed to El Salvador. Dawson v. Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 883–84
(9th Cir. 2021). The only evidence presented by Amaya was of a generalized
2

-- 2 of 3 --

nature, which does not suffice. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081
(9th Cir. 2016).
3. Amaya has waived any challenge to the denial of asylum and
withholding of removal, because he failed to address that issue in his opening brief.
See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020).
PETITION DENIED.
3

-- 3 of 3 --