Amador Sanchez Mendoza v. J. Salazar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMADOR SANCHEZ MENDOZA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
J. SALAZAR,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 19-36030
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00627-SI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BEA, BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Amador Mendoza pleaded guilty in federal court to two counts of possession
with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. He was
designated as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, but nonetheless received
a below-Guidelines-range sentence of 180 months. He now seeks review of the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 11 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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district court’s dismissal of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We review
the dismissal of a § 2241 petition de novo. Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192
(9th Cir. 2021). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Mendoza claims that he is “actually innocent” of his sentence because his
prior state criminal convictions were not predicate crimes for his designation as a
“career offender” under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increased the
advisory sentencing range. But under our recent decision in Shepherd v. Unknown
Party, — F.4th —, No. 19-15834, 2021 WL 3085784 (9th Cir. July 22, 2021) (per
curiam), this is not a cognizable “actual innocence” claim under § 2241. See id. at
*2 (explaining that our prior decision in Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2020),
in which we held that the petitioner could claim “actual innocence” of a career
offender enhancement, “is limited to petitioners who received a mandatory sentence
under a mandatory sentencing scheme”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).1
Even if Mendoza’s § 2241 theory were viable, we agree with the district court
that Mendoza also fails to show he is entitled to relief on “the specific facts of this
case.” Shepherd, 2021 WL 3085784, at *3 (quoting Gibbs v. United States, 655 F.3d
1 Mendoza also contends, in his reply brief, that the case should be remanded because
his state drug convictions were invalidated by Washington v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521
(Wash. 2021). But Blake concerns state offenses that lack mens rea requirements.
Id. at 533–34. Mendoza has not shown that Blake applies to this case.

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473, 479 (6th Cir. 2011)). In Shepherd, the petitioner’s 190-month sentence was
below the advisory range both with the career-offender enhancement (248–295
months’ imprisonment) and without it (228–270 months’ imprisonment). Id. We
explained in Shepherd that this provided another reason why the petitioner was not
entitled to § 2241 relief. Id.
Mendoza’s case presents analogous circumstances. His sentence was below
the career offender Guideline range and the non-career offender Guideline range at
the time of sentencing. Mendoza’s sentence also fell within the agreed-upon
sentencing range in his plea agreement and the sentencing range provided by the
2014 drug quantity table amendments, which allowed for discretionary re-
sentencing. Mendoza has provided no plausible basis as to why the district court
would have given him a lower sentence absent his career offender designation.
AFFIRMED.

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