United States of America v. Jacques Lisbey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JACQUES LISBEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-30024
D.C. No.
3:19-cr-00002-SLG-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 4, 2021**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: WARDLAW, MILLER, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Jacques Lisbey appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lisbey argues that § 922(g)(1)
exceeds the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority both on its face and
as applied to him. Although he acknowledges that we have previously rejected
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
AUG 6 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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similar challenges, he invites us to overrule this authority in light of the Supreme
Court’s intervening decisions in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We have repeatedly held that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. See United States v Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456,
1462 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nguyen, 88 F.3d 812, 820–21 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover,
the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Lisbey. At his plea colloquy,
Lisbey agreed to the government’s recitation of the facts, which included the fact
the firearm he possessed “had been manufactured in another state and had to have
traveled in interstate commerce to arrive in Alaska.”
We decline Lisbey’s invitation to overrule this line of precedent in light of
Sebelius and Bond. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 551–55, 649–50 (five justices
agreeing that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority only to regulate
commerce, not to compel it); Bond, 572 U.S. at 860 (holding that the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 did not reach “purely local
crimes” absent a “clear indication” of Congressional intent). Our caselaw
addressing Congress’s Commerce Clause authority as it pertains to § 922(g)(1) is
not “clearly irreconcilable” with these decisions. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

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893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.

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