Angela Stramol-Spirz v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGELA STRAMOL-SPIRZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-35005
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01072-TLF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 3, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District
Judge.
Angela Stramol-Spirz appeals the district court’s affirmance of an
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Stramol-Spirz’s claims for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social
Security Act. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history
of the case, we recite only those facts necessary to decide this appeal. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand.
We review the district court’s affirmance of an ALJ’s denial of Social
Security benefits de novo. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.
1998).
The ALJ erred in finding that Stramol-Spirz’s reported daily functioning was
inconsistent with the alleged severity and persistence of her symptoms. Stramol-
Spirz reported that her daily routine consisted of taking her medication, preparing
simple meals, reading, using Skype to talk to her family members, letting her dog
out, and watching the news. She also said that she was able to do some gardening,
cleaning, and laundry.
That Stramol-Spirz could perform these tasks at home, however, does not
justify the ALJ’s non-disability finding. To the contrary, we have held that “[o]ne
does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” Vertigan v.
Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597,
603 (9th Cir. 1989)). And in Revels v. Berryhill, we reversed a non-disability
determination where the claimant “repeatedly and consistently described the severe
limitations on her ability to complete daily activities.” 874 F.3d 648, 668 (9th Cir.

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2017). So too here: Stramol-Spirz described the limitations on her daily
functioning first in a written function report and later in her testimony before the
ALJ.
The ALJ likewise erred in partially rejecting a written statement from
Stramol-Spirz’s daughter, Alea Spirz. Because we conclude that purported
inconsistencies between the severity of Stramol-Spirz’s alleged symptoms, on the
one hand, and the objective evidence and Stramol-Spirz’s daily functioning, on the
other, do not constitute “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting Stramol-
Spirz’s testimony, those inconsistencies also do not constitute “germane” reasons
for partially rejecting Alea Spirz’s testimony. Id.
Moreover, the ALJ erred in discounting the medical opinions of Stramol-
Spirz’s treating physicians and nurse practitioner. The ALJ discounted treating
nurse practitioner Kimberly Sales’ opinion that Stramol-Spirz would be unable to
work for “at least one year.” As Sales was a treating nurse practitioner, the ALJ
could only reject her opinion for reasons “germane” to her. Dale v. Colvin, 823
F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The ALJ similarly gave little
weight to a joint opinion from Sales and Dr. Jeff Smith stating that Stramol-Spirz
would miss work more than three times per month. Because Dr. Smith was a
treating physician whose opinion was contradicted by other doctors’ opinions, the
ALJ could only reject his opinion for “specific and legitimate reasons supported by

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substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citation omitted).
Against this standard, the ALJ’s explanations for discounting Sales and Dr.
Smith’s opinions are inadequate. The ALJ asserted that their opinions were not
supported by “any objective reason[s]” and lacked sufficient explanation. We
disagree. The disability questionnaire that Sales and Dr. Smith completed in
March 2015 included extensive notes reporting pain, irritable bowel syndrome, and
depression, among other conditions. Those findings were entirely consistent with
Sales and Dr. Smith’s medical opinions.
The ALJ also erred in giving little weight to Dr. Emilia Parrott’s opinion.
The ALJ did so because Dr. Parrott “relied heavily on [Stramol-Spirz’s] subjective
reporting.” This explanation was inadequate for two reasons. First, although “[a]n
ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based to a large extent on a
claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible,”
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted), here,
the ALJ did not properly discount Stramol-Spirz’s self-reports. In fact, Stramol-
Spirz’s complaints—as reported by Dr. Parrott—relating to her pain, depression,
and other limitations were consistent with both her reported daily functioning and
the medical opinions of Sales and Dr. Smith.
Second, the ALJ misunderstood the nature of Stramol-Spirz’s impairments.
Fibromyalgia is “diagnosed entirely on the basis of patients’ reports of pain and

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other symptoms.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2004). In
addition to muscle pain, fibromyalgia can cause fatigue, cognitive or memory
problems, depression, anxiety disorder, and irritable bowel syndrome. See Revels,
874 F.3d at 657. The ALJ therefore erred by “effectively requiring objective
evidence for a disease that eludes such measurement.” Benecke, 379 at 594
(cleaned up).
These errors were also not harmless. Even though the ALJ proceeded past
step two of the sequential disability analysis, the ALJ’s errors resulted in a residual
functional capacity assessment (“RFC”) that excluded the significant limitations
caused by Stramol-Spirz’s fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and other
impairments. Because that RFC, in turn, resulted in a non-disability determination,
these errors were prejudicial. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050,
1056 (9th Cir. 2006). We remand so the agency may conduct further proceedings
under the “ordinary remand rule.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775
F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). On remand, the ALJ is directed to reevaluate the
entire medical record consistent with this disposition.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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