United States v. 2020-09-29 | 19-17362 | JAMAL ADAMS V. POSTMATES, INC. | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMAL ADAMS, et al.,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

POSTMATES, INC.,

Respondent-Appellant.

No. 19-17362

D.C. No. 4:19-cv-03042-SBA

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Saundra B. Armstrong, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 15, 2020
San Francisco, California

Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

The parties dispute whether petitioners have violated the arbitration
agreement’s Class Action Waiver. We agree with the district court that the parties’
agreement clearly delegates responsibility for resolving that dispute to the
arbitrator.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED

SEP 29 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Page 2 of 3

Section 10A.ii of the agreement states that, with one exception, “[o]nly an
arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Mutual Arbitration Provision,
including without limitation any dispute concerning arbitrability.” The one
exception, stated in section 10B.iv of the agreement, provides that any claim that
the Class Action Waiver is “unenforceable, unconscionable, void, or voidable shall
be determined only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.”
Since the dispute at issue here does not concern a claim that the Class Action
Waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, void, or voidable, the dispute does not
fall within the exception stated in section 10B.iv. It is instead covered by the
general command in section 10A.ii granting the arbitrator exclusive authority to
resolve disputes over interpretation of the agreement.
We are not persuaded by Postmates’ contention that language in section
10A.ii introduces ambiguity as to the scope of the exception provided in section
10B.iv. Postmates relies on the following sentence in section 10A.ii, which
immediately follows the language quoted above: “However, as stated in Section
10B.iv below, the preceding clause shall not apply to any dispute relating to or
arising out of the Class Action Waiver . . . , which must proceed in a court of
competent jurisdiction and cannot be heard or arbitrated by an arbitrator.”

Page 3 of 3

(Emphasis added.) The italicized phrase makes clear that the scope of the
exception requiring disputes to be resolved by a court must be determined by
reference to the language of section 10B.iv itself. And, as explained above, section
10B.iv authorizes a court to resolve a dispute involving the Class Action Waiver
only if the dispute involves a claim that the Class Action Waiver is “unenforceable,
unconscionable, void, or voidable.” The parties agree that their dispute does not fit
within one of those four specified categories, so the district court correctly held
that an arbitrator must decide whether petitioners have violated the Class Action
Waiver. See Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 673 F.3d 947, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2012).
Postmates, Inc.’s Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.