Vinton P. Frost v. United States Department of Justice

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VINTON P. FROST,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

MELANIE ANN PUSTAY; et al.,

Defendants.

No. 19-15579

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01240-JCS

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Joseph C. Spero, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2020
**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Vinton P. Frost appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUL 20 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-15579
his Freedom of Information Act action arising out of the Department of Justice’s
responses to his requests for records. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review de novo whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment
on behalf of the district court. Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017).
We vacate and remand.
Frost consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). The magistrate judge then dismissed claims against defendants Pustay
and O’Neill before they had been served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because all
parties, including unserved defendants, must consent to proceed before the
magistrate judge for jurisdiction to vest, see Williams, 875 F.3d at 503-04, we
vacate the magistrate judge’s May 15, 2017 order and remand for further
proceedings as to the dismissed claims.
In light of our disposition, we do not consider Frost’s contentions regarding
summary judgment.
All pending motions and requests are denied.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
VACATED and REMANDED.