United States v. 2020-07-17 | 19-15240 | ANTHONY COSS V. TIFFANY & BOSCO, PA | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY A. COSS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIFFANY & BOSCO, PA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-15240

D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00576-CKJ

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 14, 2020
**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Anthony A. Coss appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to prosecute, Al-Torki v.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Coss’s request for oral argument,
set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

JUL 17 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-15240
Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Coss’s claim
against defendants Tiffany & Bosco, P.A. and David Cowles for failure to
prosecute because Coss failed to comply with the district court’s order that directed
him to serve these defendants and warned that failure to comply could result in a
dismissal. See id. (discussing factors that courts must consider in determining
whether to dismiss for failure to prosecute). We reject as meritless Coss’s
contention that the district court’s order was ambiguous due to a typographical
error as to which party to serve.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Coss’s motion for
reconsideration because Coss failed to demonstrate any basis for such relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
and 60(b)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.