United States v. 2020-07-16 | 18-70952 | SODHI SINGH V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SODHI SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 18-70952
Agency No. A079-594-595
MEMORANDUM
*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 14, 2020
**
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Sodhi Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the denial
of his motion to reopen (MTR) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the BIA failed to apply the
FILED
JUL 16 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

correct legal principles in its decision denying Singh’s MTR, we grant the petition
for review.
First, the BIA made inappropriate credibility determinations. See Shouchen
Yang v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The BIA must . . . credit
evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless that evidence is inherently
unbelievable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d
977, 986 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the BIA may not make “credibility
determinations on motions to reopen”). The BIA questioned the veracity of the
declaration submitted by Singh’s mother. But her declaration was not inherently
unbelievable merely because she is an “interested party” or because Singh’s father
had previously submitted “a statement in support of [Singh’s] frivolous asylum
application.” Similarly, the BIA improperly faulted Singh for failing to submit
evidence to “substantiate[] [his] assertions” contained in his declaration without
making a finding that the facts asserted in the declaration were inherently
unbelievable. See Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 986–87; Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942,
946–47 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the BIA may not require the petitioner to
submit evidence corroborating the facts asserted in the petitioner’s own
declaration).
2

Second, the BIA did not cite or discuss the expert declaration of Dr. Cynthia
Mahmood, even though the declaration contains persuasive assertions that
conditions have worsened in India and that Singh might be subject to persecution
or torture if removed. See Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the BIA must demonstrate in its written decision that it adequately
considered all the evidence submitted by the petitioner). The BIA need not
specifically address every piece of evidence, but it “must give reasoned
consideration” to “highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence.” Cole v.
Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011). The BIA’s conclusion that Singh
“submitted no probative evidence that any authority in India is aware of his alleged
political activities, and that such individual or group has the means, interest, and
ability to persecute him as a result” is undermined by Dr. Mahmood’s declaration.
The BIA either ignored that evidence or failed to give it appropriate weight.
Finally, in questioning the veracity of Singh’s evidence, the BIA improperly
relied on the prior finding of frivolousness. The BIA may not rely on a prior
adverse credibility finding to impugn the credibility of a petitioner on an MTR
when the petitioner asserts facts different than those that contributed to the adverse
credibility finding. Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001); see
Shouchen Yang, 822 F.3d at 507 (holding that the BIA cannot apply “the maxim
3

falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—‘false in one thing, false in everything’”—when
considering an MTR).
In sum, the BIA abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct legal
standards when it denied Singh’s MTR. See Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034,
1036 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The BIA abuses its discretion when its denial of a motion to
reopen is ‘arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.’”). Accordingly, we grant the
petition for review and remand to allow the BIA to reconsider Singh’s MTR while
applying the correct standards. We express no opinion on whether the BIA should
ultimately grant Singh’s MTR.
PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.
4