Judith A. Inman v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUDITH A. INMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-35241
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05252-BAT
MEMORANDUM
*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2020
**
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Judith Inman applied for and was denied Social Security
disability benefits. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. The
FILED
JUN 30 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

district court affirmed the denial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
1. The government concedes that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who
presided over Inman’s case erred in initially concluding that Inman had no
medically determinable impairment. However, the ALJ made alternative findings
assuming that Inman had the medically determinable impairment of “Chronic Pain
Syndrome, Headaches, Optic Nerve Disorder, and Photophobia.” Accordingly, the
ALJ’s error was harmless. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“We may affirm the ALJ’s decision even if the ALJ made an error, so long as the
error was harmless, meaning it was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Inman argues that the ALJ improperly weighed medical evidence from
certain of her treating physicians, whose opinions are generally “afforded more
weight than those of non-examining physicians.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631
(9th Cir. 2007). However, deference to their opinions depends in part on whether
they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]
case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Inman’s examining physicians based
their opinions about her disability on her reported symptoms, but did not confirm
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them with objective testing. We therefore will not disturb the ALJ’s weighting of
their opinions, or that of Dr. Boone, which Inman also challenges.
Inman also lists “other medical evidence” and opinions that she argues that
the ALJ should have considered. Some of this information, such as Dr. Kooiker’s
report, was considered. Inman does not explain how the other reports undermine
the ALJ’s decision, as they say nothing about the limitations she might face in
working and do not controvert the diagnoses of migraines and light sensitivity.
3. Inman argues that the ALJ erroneously found her testimony and
allegations not credible. However, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and
convincing reasons for not fully crediting her testimony. See Vasquez v. Astrue,
572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). For example, the ALJ noted that Inman’s
claimed light sensitivity and eye pain was more extreme than that which she had
previously described to her doctors and in her state workers’ compensation claim.
She told Dr. Nguyen that sunglasses helped her symptoms, but testified before the
ALJ that she cannot keep her eyes open at all. Further, the ALJ wrote that Inman’s
activity level casts doubt on her allegations, as she is still able to exercise daily and
visits with a friend at Starbucks weekly.
4. The ALJ did not err in discounting testimony from Inman’s husband. In
order to “discount competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ must give reasons that
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are germane to each witness.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ found that Inman’s husband’s
testimony was more extreme than Inman’s. Substantial evidence supported this
finding. For example, Inman’s husband testified that he lives in the garage
“[b]ecause there’s no lights allowed in the house.” Inman herself clarified that this
was an exaggeration, and that “no light” was actually “low light.”
5. Inman argues that the ALJ erred in failing to account for her functional
limitations in the assessment of her residual functional capacity. The ALJ found
that her disability would not prevent her from performing a full range of work,
including her most recent job as a claims clerk, as long as the work would not
require exposure to hazards; will allow wearing dark sunglasses; and does not
require exposure to bright light. Given our conclusions that the ALJ did not err in
weighing the medical evidence, or in discounting Inman’s and her husband’s
descriptions of her limitations, this determination is also supported by substantial
evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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