United States v. 2020-03-19 | 18-71912 | SATVIR SINGH V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SATVIR SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-71912

Agency No. A208-383-161

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 6, 2020
**

Seattle, Washington

Before: IKUTA and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER,
***
District Judge.

Satvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

***
The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
FILED

MAR 19 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo,
except to the extent that the BIA’s interpretation of governing statutes and
regulations deserves deference, Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.
2008), and we review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence,
Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
The BIA did not err in declining to consider Singh’s arguments regarding
membership in two proposed particular social groups that he raised for the first
time on appeal before the BIA. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th
Cir. 2019); In re W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 190–91 (B.I.A. 2018).
Further, to the extent Singh did raise a proposed particular social group
before the IJ, the BIA did not err in determining that it was not cognizable. See In
re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334 (A.G. 2018) (a particular social group is not
cognizable unless it exists independently of the harm asserted); In re M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227, 241 (B.I.A. 2014) (“landowners” is not a cognizable particular
social group unless the society shares a common understanding of landownership
and considers landowners to be a discrete, distinct group).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the harm
Singh suffered resulted from an intrafamily dispute rather than persecution based
on a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.

3
2009) (“[T]he term ‘on account of’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(42)(A) requires an
asylum applicant to prove that she was persecuted ‘because of’ a protected
ground.”); Molina-Morales v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (personal
vendetta does not constitute a protected ground).
Accordingly, Singh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Singh failed to show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or
with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to India. See
Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh failed to show that
the past harm he experienced rose to the level of torture, and the agency reasonably
concluded that Singh could safely relocate internally within India after considering
his individualized situation. See id.; Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661, 663 (9th
Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, Singh’s CAT claim also fails.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.