United States v. 2020-03-18 | 16-71232 | FILOMENA MUNOZ-VENTURA V. WILLIAM BARR | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILOMENA DEL CARMEN MUNOZ-
VENTURA; MARCELA ABIGAIL
MUNOZ-VENTURA,

Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-71232

Agency Nos. A206-782-458
A206-782-459

MEMORANDUM
*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted February 3, 2020
Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Filomena Del Carmen Munoz-Ventura and her daughter, whose claim is
derivative of her mother’s, are natives and citizens of El Salvador. They petition
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their
appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED

MAR 18 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2
1. Even if we assume that Munoz-Ventura’s proposed social group of
“Central American women who are the victims of domestic violence” is
cognizable, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Munoz-
Ventura failed to establish that she is a member of that social group. Monjaraz-
Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We review the BIA’s findings
of fact . . . for substantial evidence and must uphold the BIA’s finding unless the
evidence compels a contrary result.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (providing that
an applicant must be a member of her proposed social group).
Munoz-Ventura asserts that “members of [the proposed] social group share
a[n] . . . immutable characteristic of being unable to leave their domestic
relationship.” But substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding, adopted by the
BIA, that Munoz-Ventura was not unable to leave her relationship with her
domestic partner: her partner did not return to her home after his release from jail,
she “always evaded him” and had “nothing to do with him” after that time, and
they did not talk between his finding a new partner in January 2009 and her leaving
El Salvador in 2014.
2. Even if we assume that Munoz-Ventura’s proposed social group of
“Central American women who are repeatedly raped by gang members” is
cognizable, the BIA correctly determined that Munoz-Ventura failed to establish
that she was raped on account of a protected ground. Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592

3
F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an “applicant alleging past
persecution has the burden of establishing that . . . the persecution was on account
of one or more protected grounds”).
Munoz-Ventura argues that she was raped “based on the fact that she was a
woman who had already been raped,” but the record evidence does not support
such a nexus. Her attacker’s warning not to tell anyone does not establish that he
raped her a second time because she was already a rape victim. This argument also
does not account for the first rape, which could not have been on account of her
status as a rape victim.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.