United States v. 2020-02-27 | 18-17014 | THERESA SHERIDAN V. BARBARA LAWALL | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THERESA SHERIDAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARBARA LAWALL, in her official
capacity as Pima County Attorney;
COUNTY OF PIMA,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-17014
D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00588-CKJ
MEMORANDUM
*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2020
**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Theresa Sheridan, a former deputy county attorney, appeals from
the summary judgment entered in favor of Defendants Barbara LaWall and the
FILED
FEB 27 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
* *
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

County of Pima in this Title VII action. On de novo review, McGinest v. GTE
Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004), we affirm.
Plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, but Defendants
gave legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing her. See Villiarimo v. Aloha
Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing shifting burden of
proof). The event that precipitated the firing was an incident in which Plaintiff
took unredacted medical documents from a judge’s chambers, without permission,
which ultimately resulted in dismissal of a criminal case on account of her
intentional prosecutorial misconduct. When firing Plaintiff, Defendants
emphasized her "[d]ishonest and deceitful conduct" in falsely telling the court and
her supervisors that she had not looked at the unredacted records.
In addition, Plaintiff had a long history of performance problems, as to
which Defendants showed considerable leniency. For example, Plaintiff’s then-
supervisor sought her termination during the probationary period, but Defendants
gave her a chance to improve; later Plaintiff was counseled regarding unacceptable
performance in areas including trial skills and demeanor in the courtroom, and she
received additional training; and in formal evaluations she consistently received a
score of "Does not always meet expectations" in the areas of trial preparation, trial
advocacy, quality of work, and professionalism.
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Plaintiff’s evidence of pretext does not create a genuine dispute of material
fact. A negative comment in which Defendant LaWall referred to Plaintiff as "this
woman" expressed exasperation but did not display discriminatory intent. See
Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that
"clearly sexist" statements by the employer are direct evidence of pretext). And
the two male comparators were not similarly situated. See id. (noting that
circumstantial evidence of pretext must be "specific and substantial" to survive a
motion for summary judgment). About a decade before Plaintiff’s termination,
two male prosecutors committed intentional misconduct but were not fired. One
had not been a consistently poor performer before the misconduct occurred, and
neither had been dishonest with their supervisor; yet those were factors on which
Defendants relied in terminating Plaintiff’s employment.
AFFIRMED.
3