United States v. 2020-02-10 | 18-17426 | RICHARD RYNN V. GREGORY MCKAY | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD RYNN, next friend and parent of
MR, a minor person; next friend of M.R.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GREGORY A. McKAY, in his official
capacity as Director of Arizona Department
of Child Safety and personally; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

RENEE MILLER; et al.,

Defendants.

No. 18-17426

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00414-JJT

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 4, 2020
**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

FEB 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 18-17426
Richard Rynn appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
defendants’ removal of his minor daughter from his custody. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rynn’s claims against defendant
Frontera Arizona Empact-SPC because Rynn failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must . . . show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Ariz. Rev.
Stat. §§12-2603, 13-3620.

3 18-17426
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Rynn’s claims
against the State Defendants and the Quail Run Defendants pursuant to Arizona
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) for Rynn’s failure to file an opposition to the
motions to dismiss. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that this court gives “[b]road
deference” to district court’s application of its local rules); D. Ariz. Loc. R. 7.2(i).
AFFIRMED.