United States of America v. DANNY SAN NICOLAS, AKA Siete

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANNY SAN NICOLAS, AKA Siete,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19-10049
D.C. No. 3:09-cr-00966-CRB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019 **
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Danny San Nicolas appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges one special condition of supervised release imposed upon revocation of
supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
San Nicolas first argues that the district court deprived him of due process
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 16 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 19-10049
by failing to give him advance notice of its intention to impose a special condition
of supervised release permitting warrantless, suspicionless searches. However,
given that the condition was imposed as a part of San Nicolas’s original sentence,
and was in effect during the revocation proceedings, “the record suggested the
condition as a possibility before it was imposed,” United States v. Quinzon, 643
F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted), and San Nicolas was
afforded adequate notice.
San Nicolas next contends that the district court had a heightened duty to
explain its imposition of the suspicionless search condition, which it failed to
satisfy. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008) (condition
involving a “significant liberty interest” requires more detailed explanation).
However, San Nicolas provides no authority for his argument that a suspicionless
search condition implicates the narrow class of significant liberty interests that
trigger the heightened requirement. See United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d
1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012) (condition that infringes a defendant’s right to associate
with an intimate family member implicates a significant liberty interest); United
States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (conditions that compel a
person to take antipsychotic medication, or undergo penile plethysmograph testing
or chemical castration implicate significant liberty interests). Further, contrary to
San Nicolas’s argument, the suspicionless search condition does not violate his

-- 2 of 3 --

3 19-10049
Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857
(2006) (the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit suspicionless searches of
parolees); United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding “no
sound reason for distinguishing parole from supervised release” and upholding a
warrantless search condition of supervised release). Finally, the district court’s
reasons for imposing a suspicionless search condition are apparent from the record
as a whole, which indicates that the condition was necessary and appropriate in
light of San Nicolas’s criminal history, his numerous violations of conditions of
supervised release, the frequency of his contact with law enforcement, and the
need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089-
90.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --