Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center; v. Patricia A. Grantham; United States Forest Service

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KLAMATH-SISKIYOU WILDLANDS
CENTER; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PATRICIA A. GRANTHAM; UNITED
STATES FOREST SERVICE,
Defendants,
and
AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE
COUNCIL,
Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 19-15384
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-02785-TLN-DMC
MEMORANDUM*
KLAMATH-SISKIYOU WILDLANDS
CENTER; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PATRICIA A. GRANTHAM, Klamath
National Forest Supervisor; UNITED
No. 19-15597
D.C. No.
2:18-cv-02785-TLN-DMC
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
NOV 22 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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STATES FOREST SERVICE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE
COUNCIL,
Intervenor-Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 21, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
This case comes to us on appeal from the district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction against a United States Forest Service project in Klamath
National Forest in California. The enjoined project was authorized by the Forest
Service in September 2018. The project was designed to address hazardous
conditions in the Forest and reduce the risk of future forest fires following the 2017
Abney Fire, which burned 90,000 acres in Northern California and Oregon,
including 10,000 acres in Klamath National Forest. The district court enjoined
aspects of the project that involve logging and removal of hazardous trees and
those that are dead or dying. The district court later stayed its injunction pending

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appeal. We find that the district court failed to consider all mandatory factors
before issuing the injunction and that the court’s stay order engaged in the correct
analysis. Therefore, we reverse the order granting the preliminary injunction.
We review a district court’s order granting or denying a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v.
Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (per curiam). A district court’s
legal interpretations are reviewed de novo, id., and factual findings for clear error,
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008). Additionally, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance
of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a
preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood
of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for
the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.
The district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction found “serious
questions” as to whether the project violated the National Forest Management Act
and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court also found that any

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harm caused by the project would be irreparable. Without further analysis, the
district court relied on these findings on the first two Winter factors to support its
determination that the balance of equities favored the plaintiffs and that enjoining
the project was in the public interest. This was an abuse of discretion and ignored
Winter’s command that “courts of equity should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” 555
U.S. at 24 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
The district court’s error was compounded by its reliance on the “serious
questions” test for an injunction, which requires “a balance of hardships that tips
sharply towards the plaintiff.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135
(emphasis added).
The district court fully considered the balance of equities and the public
interest when it decided the defendants’ stay request. Applying the same legal
standard as used in granting the initial injunction, this time the district court arrived
at the conclusion that these factors counseled against an injunction and stayed its
prior order. This decision rested primarily on the fire prevention/mitigation
benefits of the project that were in the public interest and were permanently
threatened by the preliminary injunction. We agree with this conclusion.
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the district court abused its discretion when staying
the injunction by deferring to the Forest Service’s view of the equities is incorrect.

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Though the district court’s stay order said the court “must defer to the Forest
Service’s determination that without a stay the harm will become truly
irreparable,” the court independently noted the public interest in protecting against
catastrophic fires and then independently evaluated the evidence presented by the
Forest Service that the injunction would threaten projects related to preventing and
fighting catastrophic fires. This was not an abuse of discretion. Likewise, it was
not clearly erroneous for the district court to credit the Forest Service’s evidence
that enjoining the challenged aspects of the project would threaten non-enjoined
aspects as well. These claims by the Forest Service were not unsupported
allegations or post hoc rationalizations. See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. BLM, 625
F.3d 1092, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). The Forest Service’s decision notice approving
the project clearly links the project’s revenue-producing components to the other
components that plaintiffs do not challenge.
In sum, we hold the district court abused its discretion when it issued the
injunction in reliance on only the first two Winter factors. Giving proper
consideration to all four factors, and paying “particular regard for the public
consequences,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, we agree with the analysis in the district
court’s stay order and find an injunction is not warranted.1
1 We find the proper evaluation of all four Winter factors leads to the conclusion
that the preliminary injunction was not warranted, even assuming the district

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REVERSED.
court’s analysis of the merits was correct. Therefore, we express no position on the
merits of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the project.

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