United States of America v. Matthew Tyler Charles

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW TYLER CHARLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-30225
D.C. No. 3:17-cr-05531-RBL-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Matthew Tyler Charles appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 60-month sentence imposed upon his guilty-plea conviction for
domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Charles first contends that the district court erred by denying a two-level
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
We review for clear error a district court’s determination of whether a defendant
has accepted responsibility. See United States v. Rodriguez, 851 F.3d 931, 949
(9th Cir. 2017). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Charles’s
conduct, which Charles conceded below warranted an upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice, was inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (obstructive conduct “ordinarily indicates that the
defendant has not accepted responsibility”); United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d 378,
383 (9th Cir. 1994) (when defendant receives an obstruction of justice
enhancement, an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is available only in the
“extraordinary case” when the obstructive conduct is not inconsistent with
acceptance of responsibility). Moreover, contrary to Charles’s contention, the
district court sufficiently explained its refusal to grant the reduction. See Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-58 (2007).
Charles also argues that the statutory maximum sentence is substantively
unreasonable, given his “horrendous” childhood and his postconviction efforts to
educate and rehabilitate himself. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The 60-month sentence is
substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and

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the totality of the circumstances, including the seriousness of the offense and
Charles’s significant criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.

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