JAVIER SANTANA RUIZ, AKA Javier Ruiz Santana v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAVIER SANTANA RUIZ, AKA Javier
Ruiz Santana,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70204
Agency No. A088-752-099
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 13, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District
Judge.
An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Javier Santana Ruiz’s applications for
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Santana’s appeal. We have
jurisdiction of Santana’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the
petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Santana failed to
establish that he had suffered past persecution in Mexico because of a protected
ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The evidence instead supported the
conclusion that Santana was the victim of “harassment by criminals motivated by
theft,” which “bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d
1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA also correctly concluded that Santana’s
proposed social group of those persecuted by police is impermissibly circular. See
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (holding that a social group
could not “be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subjected
to harm in the past”); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)
(same); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating
that a social group cannot be “amorphous,” and must “generally be recognizable by
other members of the community” (quoting Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d
1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2013)).
2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Santana did not
establish a reasonable likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(2). Santana offered no reason to believe that his assailants—whom he

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described as motivated by pecuniary gain—would seek him out, years later, now that
he no longer operates a business. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s finding
that Santana could relocate to live with his family in Oaxaca, a considerable distance
from where he was attacked. See Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162–64 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc).
PETITION DENIED

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