Byron Estrada-Chacon v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BYRON ESTRADA-CHACON,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 17-70505
Agency No. A091-617-775
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Byron Estrada-Chacon, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from
an immigration judge’s decision denying asylum and related relief. Our jurisdiction
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law. Ahmed v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny in part and dismiss in part
the petition for review.
The agency did not err or violate due process in determining that Estrada-
Chacon’s conviction under California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 288(a) in 1988 is an
aggravated felony, where the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) includes “sexual abuse of a minor” in the
list of aggravated felonies, and the definition of an aggravated felony under
IIRIRA applies regardless of the date of the commission of the crime. See Becker
v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007); Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770
F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To prevail on a due-process claim, a petitioner
must demonstrate both a violation of rights and prejudice.”). Accordingly, the
agency properly determined Estrada-Chacon is ineligible for asylum. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (“sexual abuse of a minor”
is an aggravated felony); United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 520 (9th
Cir. 2009) (a conviction under CPC § 288(a) constitutes “sexual abuse of a
minor”).
Estrada-Chacon’s contention that CPC § 288(c)(1) is broader than the
federal definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” is unavailing, where he was
convicted under CPC § 288(a).
We lack jurisdiction to review Estrada-Chacon’s unexhausted contention

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that his conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude. See Tijani v. Holder,
628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal claims
not presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the BIA.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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