Kadva Patidar 42 Gam Samaj v. County of Riverside, a municipal corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KADVA PATIDAR 42 GAM SAMAJ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-56771
D.C. No.
5:17-cv-00902-PSG-SP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 8, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,*** Judge.
Kadva Patidar 42 Gam Samaj (“Samaj”) appeals the district court’s order
granting the County of Riverside’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. We review
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jerron
West, Inc. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 129 F.3d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997).
We review “for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to amend.”
AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). We
affirm.
The Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) precludes federal district court jurisdiction
where, as here, a taxpayer seeks to enjoin state or local tax collection and that
taxpayer has a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in state court.1 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341. The TIA’s prohibition on federal court jurisdiction includes cases where
the state or local tax is alleged to violate the federal constitution. See Jerron West,
Inc., 129 F.3d at 1336-37. California’s administrative and judicial process for
resolving tax claims meets the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” requirement of
the TIA, even though California requires taxpayers to pay first and then challenge
the tax. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1982).
Samaj’s alleged “inability to pay the tax does not avoid the jurisdictional bar” of
the TIA. Wood v. Sargeant, 694 F.2d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, the
principle of comity has long prevented federal courts from rendering declaratory
judgments or injunctions, or hearing a damages action brought under section 1983,
1 Samaj’s argument that the tax was a penalty or fee instead of a tax was not raised
before the district court and was therefore waived. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d
1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

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to redress an allegedly unconstitutional state tax system. See Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1980).
Samaj claims that a tax assessed by Riverside County violated its First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights under section 1983. This is
precisely the type of case that “Congress wrote the [Tax Injunction] Act to
address” because Samaj seeks a federal-court order enabling it to avoid paying
local taxes. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107 (2004). The district court correctly
held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, any amendment of the complaint would have been futile. See Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.

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