Janos Kulcsar v. Debbie Asuncion

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANOS KULCSAR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DEBBIE ASUNCION,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17-55898
D.C. No. 15-cv-01080-DSF-AS
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, OWENS, Circuit Judges, and SETTLE, District Judge**
Petitioner-Appellant Janos Kulcsar (“Kulcsar”) appeals the denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from a jury conviction in state
court. Specifically, he argues that his due process rights were violated because
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 15 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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there was (1) an unreasonable delay in filing charges and (2) insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for first-degree murder. We review de novo a district
court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d
977, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and
we affirm.
1. Kulcsar’s first claim for relief is that the government’s pre-accusation
delay of approximately twenty-five years violated his due process rights. The
California Court of Appeal (“CCA”) denied this claim, concluding that Kulcsar
had failed to establish actual prejudice due to the delay. Pre-accusation delay may
violate an individual’s right to due process of law. United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 789–90 (1977). The petitioner, however, must first “prove ‘actual, non-
speculative prejudice from the delay.’” United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d
1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1290
(9th Cir. 1992)). Only then should the reviewing court weigh “the length of the
delay . . . against the reasons for the delay.” Id.
In this case, Kulcsar has failed to establish that the CCA either implemented
a standard contrary to clearly established federal law or unreasonably applied that
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The CCA concluded that Kulcsar’s assertions of
prejudice due to unavailable evidence and fading memories were either not caused
by the delay or were purely speculative. Kulcsar fails to establish that, under

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deferential review, this conclusion is objectively unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000)).
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.
2. Kulcsar’s second claim for relief is that there was insufficient evidence to
support his first-degree murder conviction. The CCA concluded that the evidence,
although circumstantial, was more than sufficient to support Kulcsar’s conviction.
On habeas review, this Court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
In this case, Kulcsar fails to establish that the CCA’s conclusion was
objectively unreasonable. Kulcsar argues that the evidence of premeditation and
deliberation, an essential element of first-degree murder, was thin. Kulcsar,
however, fails to show that the jury’s conclusion, supported by substantial
circumstantial evidence, fell “below the threshold of bare rationality.” Coleman v.
Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012) (per curiam) (“[T]he only question under
Jackson is whether [the jury’s] finding was so insupportable as to fall below the
threshold of bare rationality.”). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of
this claim.
AFFIRMED.

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