Dee V. Towles v. JAMES DZURENDA, NDOC Director;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEE V. TOWLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES DZURENDA, NDOC Director; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-16218
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00177-RCJ-VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Dee V. Towles appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d
1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Towles’s supervisory liability claims
against defendants Dzurenda and Baca because Towles failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that these defendants were personally involved in a
constitutional violation or that their conduct caused any such violation. See Starr
v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing
supervisory liability).
Dismissal of Towles’s claim against the Nevada Department of Corrections
was proper because Towles failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged
constitutional violation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (setting forth
requirements for a § 1983 claim of municipal liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Towles’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Towles failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
The district court dismissed Towles’s deliberate indifference claim against

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defendant Dr. Naughton for failure to state a claim. However, Towles alleged in
his amended complaint that Dr. Naughton knew that Towles was in “fragile health
status” and under “chronic care” for years but prescribed him new medication
without consulting a drug interactions book, and that Towles suffered several heart
attacks one month after he took the new medication. Liberally construed, these
allegations “are sufficient to warrant ordering [Dr. Naughton] to file an answer.”
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1116; see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58
(9th Cir. 2004) (prison officials act with deliberate indifference if they know of and
disregard an excessive risk to inmate health). We reverse and remand for further
proceedings on this claim only.
AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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