Luz Aquino v. Pnc Mortgage;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUZ AQUINO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PNC MORTGAGE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-17170
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00068-GMN-
GWF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Luz Aquino appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her
action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and state law claims related to a mortgage on real property. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 15-17170
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854
F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Aquino’s FDCPA claim against PNC
Bank, N.A. because Aquino failed to allege facts sufficient to show that PNC was a
debt collector under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from
the definition of debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its behalf); Schlegel v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff “must
plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
[the defendant] is a debt collector” (citation internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Aquino’s FDCPA claim against Clear
Recon Corporation because Aquino failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-1692g. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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