In re: LOFTON RYAN BURRIS v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: LOFTON RYAN BURRIS,
Debtor,
______________________________
LOFTON RYAN BURRIS,
Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; DEUTSCHE
BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY,
as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust
2006-WF1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series
2006-WF1,
Appellees.
No. 13-56763
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-05917-GAF-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Burris’s request for oral
argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Lofton Ryan Burris appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his action arising from foreclosure proceedings.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir.
2002). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to withdraw
the reference of Burris’s adversary proceeding from the bankruptcy court because
the underlying bankruptcy case had been dismissed. See Smith v. T-Mobile USA
Inc., 570 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The case or controversy requirement of
Article III restricts federal court jurisdiction to disputes capable of judicial
resolution. A case becomes moot, and incapable of judicial resolution, when the
issues presented are no longer live” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly concluded it could not construe Burris’s “Notice
of Removal” as an initial filing because Burris failed to establish an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. See Kokkoenen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (explaining federal jurisdiction generally); Cook Inlet
Region, Inc. v. Rude, 690 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining federal

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question jurisdiction); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th
Cir. 2001) (explaining diversity jurisdiction).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’
requests for judicial notice because the documents in question were either filed in
federal court, or matters of public record. See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark
Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review); see also Hyatt
v. Yee, 871 F.3d 1067, 1071 n.15 (9th Cir. 2017) (matters of public record are
properly the subject of judicial notice); Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d
1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “documents on file in federal or
state courts” are properly the subject of judicial notice).
To the extent Burris argues that the district court’s dismissal was an
improper remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, we lack jurisdiction to consider that
determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b).
AFFIRMED.

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