United States of America v. Willie Clifton

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIE CLIFTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-10489
D.C. No.
3:15-cr-00479-CRB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 12, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Willie Clifton (“Clifton”) appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Clifton argues that the
FILED
FEB 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.1
Officer Venzon properly searched Clifton incident to his arrest. An arrest
occurs when, considering the “totality of the circumstances,” a reasonable person
would have believed he or she was not free to leave after brief questioning.
Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996); see United States v.
Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009). After learning that Clifton’s
license was suspended, Officer Venzon ordered Clifton out of the car and handcuffed
him almost immediately, explaining that he was under arrest. Once handcuffed, a
reasonable person in Clifton’s circumstances would have believed “indefinite
custodial detention [was] inevitable.” Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d at 884 (citing Kraus
v. Pierce Cty., 793 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1986)). The search that followed was
therefore lawful. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974).
That is so even if Clifton was not arrested until after the search. A search
incident to arrest need not precede the arrest; rather, the critical inquiry “is whether
the search is ‘roughly contemporaneous with the arrest.’” United States v. Smith, 389
1 The denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo, but the factual
findings underlying the district court’s decision are reviewed for clear error. United
States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v.
Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008)).
2

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F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889,
892 (9th Cir. 1999)). Here, the arrest and search were not “so separated in time or by
intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the former.” Id.
(quoting McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893). Thus, the motion to suppress was properly
denied.
AFFIRMED.
3

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