Frederick Lee Jackson v. FELECIA HODGE, Library Technical Assistant, in her official and individual capacity;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FREDERICK LEE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FELECIA HODGE, Library Technical
Assistant, in her official and individual
capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-55997
D.C. No. 5:15-cv-01169-PSG-RAO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018**
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Frederick Lee Jackson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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novo. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)
(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s access-to-courts claim
because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the prison’s
photocopying policy caused an actual injury. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (an access-to-courts claim requires an actual injury).
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s failure-to-protect claim
because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the prison’s
photocopying policy posed a substantial risk of serious harm that defendants knew
of and disregarded. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062,
1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (elements of a failure-to-protect claim).
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s supervisory liability claim
because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants Hightshoe,
Covello, Briggs, and Hatton were personally involved in a constitutional
deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing
supervisory liability under § 1983); see also Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076,
1085 (9th Cir. 2014) (no vicarious liability for supervisors under § 1983).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

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appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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