Pedro Baldovinos v. Paul Copenhaver

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PEDRO BALDOVINOS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PAUL COPENHAVER,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15-16537
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00806-SKO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted March 8, 2017***
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Pedro Baldovinos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying
his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review the denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see Tablada v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
Baldovinos challenges the finding of the disciplinary hearing officer
(“DHO”) that he committed riot-like conduct and contends that the disciplinary
proceedings violated his right to due process. The record reflects that Baldovinos’s
disciplinary hearing comported with due process and “some evidence” supports the
DHO’s findings. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)
(requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary
decision); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-71 (1974) (setting forth due
process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings). We reject Baldovinos’s
claim that the DHO, a Bureau of Prisons employee, lacked authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions against him for conduct that occurred at a contract facility.
See 28 C.F.R. § 541.10(a) (2007). Finally, we reject Baldovinos’s double jeopardy
claims. See United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (“the
prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar criminal prosecution for conduct
that has been the subject of prison disciplinary sanctions,” and loss of good
conduct time does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
We decline to consider Baldovinos’s claim, raised for the first time on
appeal, that he is actually innocent of his 2010 criminal convictions in the Western

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District of Texas. See Taniguchi v. Schultz, 303 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.

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