Gail Rosier v. Jeffrey Strobel

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GAIL ROSIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY STROBEL,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-15091
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01399-JJT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: CANBY, SILER,*** and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The contract and tort claims alleged by Gail Rosier in this diversity action
arise out of the attempts by her ex-husband, Jeffrey Strobel, to collect child support
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and out of statements made by Strobel in New Hampshire and Arizona state court
proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the contract claims
precluded by a New Hampshire state court judgment and the remaining claims
premised on statements for which Strobel enjoys immunity. We affirm.
1. Rosier’s contract claims arise from a child support agreement between her
and Strobel. Upon Strobel’s motion, a New Hampshire trial court enforced the
agreement, ordering Rosier to make funds available for the education of the couple’s
son. The court later found Rosier in contempt of that order, and ordered her to pay
child support arrearages. Applying New Hampshire law, see Holcombe v. Hosmer,
477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007), the district court correctly found Rosier’s
contract claims in this case precluded because they “could have been litigated” in
that proceeding. In re Hampers, 97 A.3d 1106, 1112–13 (N.H. 2014) (quoting Gray
v. Kelly, 13 A.3d 848, 851 (N.H. 2010)); see also Osman v. Gagnon, 876 A.2d 193,
195 (N.H. 2005).
2. Rosier’s tort claims arise from Strobel’s statements to the New Hampshire
court during the proceedings described above and his statements to an Arizona court
regarding Rosier’s sentencing for an unrelated crime. These statements are
privileged from civil liability because they were “made in the course of judicial

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proceedings” and “pertinent or relevant to the proceedings.” Provencher v. Buzzell-
Plourde Assocs., 711 A.2d 251, 255 (N.H. 1998); see also Green Acres Tr. v.
London, 688 P.2d 617, 620–22 (Ariz. 1984). And, because Strobel’s statements
were privileged, the district court did not err in denying Rosier leave to amend her
complaint to add a claim for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
relating to those statements.1
AFFIRMED.
1 In any event, Rule 11 sanctions are sought by motion, not as part of a
complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).

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