Paul M. Sanders v. Legacy Emanuel Medical Center, an Oregon corporation;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL M. SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEGACY EMANUEL MEDICAL
CENTER, an Oregon corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-35977
D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00690-PK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Paul M. Sanders appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069
(9th Cir. 2001). We reverse and remand.
The district court erred by concluding that Sanders had not stated an
EMTALA claim against defendant Legacy Emanuel Medical Center. Liberally
construed, Sanders alleged facts showing that he had received a different
examination than would have been offered to other patients presenting similar
symptoms. Sanders also alleged that as a result of the disparate screening, the
hospital failed to identify an emergency medical condition and he therefore
suffered harm. Assuming these allegations are true, the allegations in the First
Amended Complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Jackson v.
East Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (under EMTALA “the
touchstone is whether . . . the procedure is designed to identify an emergency
medical condition, that is manifested by acute and severe symptoms[,]” which is
determined by whether an examination is comparable to that “offered to other
patients presenting similar symptoms . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (providing that “if any individual . . .
comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual’s

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behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must
provide for an appropriate medical screening examination . . . to determine whether
or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.”); id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (“Any
individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital’s
violation of a requirement of this section may. . . obtain those damages available
for personal injury . . . .”); id. § 1395dd(e)(1) (defining “emergency medical
condition”); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting obligation
to construe pro se pleadings liberally).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this disposition.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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