James Lea v. Richard Steinbronn, Sgt.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
James Lea,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Richard Steinbronn, Sgt.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-35522
D.C. No. 13-cv-00259-MO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael Mosman, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 10, 2016
Portland, Oregon
Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY,**
District Judge.
Plaintiff, James Lea, appeals the district court’s order granting defendant
Sergeant Richard Steinbronn’s motion for summary judgment on Lea’s § 1983
claims for excessive force and unlawful arrest and seizure stemming from Lea’s
FILED
DEC 01 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

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2011 arrest at gunpoint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, and we
affirm.
We review summary-judgment determinations de novo and ask whether,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
there are any genuine disputes of material fact.1
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lea’s
unlawful-arrest and -seizure claims.
Oregon Revised Statute § 163.195 makes it a Class A misdemeanor to
“recklessly engage[] in conduct [that] creates a substantial risk of serious physical
injury to another person.” The harm “need only be possible or potential; it need
not actually occur.”2 In their briefing, both parties discussed at length the issue of
whether ORS § 163.195 is broad enough to encompass Lea’s conduct in this case.
There is no case directly on point, nor does the statute answer that question. Even
if the Oregon statute did not criminalize Lea’s conduct, Steinbronn is entitled to
summary judgment on Lea’s unlawful-arrest and -seizure claims based on his
reasonable belief that it did.3
1 See Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
2 State v. Cervantes, 223 P.3d 425, 434 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
3 See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (holding that a
reasonable mistake of law can support reasonable suspicion).

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2. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lea’s
excessive-force claim.
As the Supreme Court explained in Graham v. Connor, in excessive-force
cases like this one, courts must balance the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on
a person’s liberty with the “countervailing governmental interests at stake” to
determine whether the force used was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.4 Relevant Graham factors include “the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”5 “The question is not simply whether the force was necessary to
accomplish a legitimate police objective; it is whether the force used was
reasonable in light of all the relevant circumstances.”6
The officers’ approach was perhaps an overreaction, but the force used was
not unconstitutionally excessive. Though Steinbronn and his team were
investigating a misdemeanor offense and Lea did not resist arrest, the officers had
reason to fear for their safety or the safety of others. The arrest occurred in a
crowded public parking lot at night, Lea’s handgun was nearby, there had been a
shooting in the area only two weeks earlier, and the event that was being held that
4 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
5 Id.
6 Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

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evening was known to attract gang members. Under these circumstances,
Steinbronn’s use of force—which resulted in no physical injury to Lea—was
reasonable. And even if the force used were excessive, Steinbronn is entitled to
qualified immunity from Lea’s excessive-force claim because “it would [not] be
clear to a reasonable officer that [Steinbronn’s] conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted.”7
Because the district court properly granted summary judgment in
Steinbronn’s favor on all claims, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
7 Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted)
(internal citations omitted).

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