Dion Anderson v. EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., California State Governor;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DION ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., California
State Governor; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 15-16408
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-01839-AWI-
DLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 26, 2016**
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dion Anderson appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for
FILED
AUG 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v.
Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,
1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Anderson’s action because Anderson
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be
construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief).
The district court properly determined that, as a pro se party, Anderson
could not litigate the instant action as a class action. See Simon v. Hartford Life,
Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well established that the privilege to
represent oneself pro se provided by [28 U.S.C.] § 1654 is personal to the litigant
and does not extend to other parties or entities.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Anderson’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Anderson failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to recuse the
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magistrate judge because Anderson failed to establish any ground for recusal. See
Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth
standard of review and grounds for recusal).
Anderson’s contentions regarding improper venue are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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