Luis Alejandro Lopez v. J. Taylor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUIS ALEJANDRO LOPEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
J. TAYLOR,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 15-35422
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00506-CL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 7, 2016**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BEA and OWENS, Circuit Judges and BURNS,*** District Judge.
Luis A. Lopez, an Oregon state court prisoner, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction
FILED
JUL 14 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. As the parties are familiar with the facts,
we do not recount them here.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), it was
not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined
by the United States Supreme Court, for the Oregon Court of Appeals to hold that
specific performance of Lopez’s prior agreement with the Multnomah County
District Attorney’s Office was an adequate remedy for the District Attorney’s
Office’s breach of that agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
According to Supreme Court precedent as established in Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), a state violates an individual’s due process rights when
it breaches a plea agreement, and that individual is entitled to a remedy. Id. at 262.
The state court, however, has discretion to craft an appropriate remedy, as it is “in
a better position to decide” the type of remedy that “the circumstances of [the] case
require.” Id. at 263. One possible remedy the Supreme Court mentioned was
specific performance of the agreement. Id.
As is evident from Santobello, and as Lopez does not dispute, it is within the
state court’s discretion to determine the remedy for breach of a plea agreement.
See id. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that specific performance in this
case—requiring the District Attorney’s Office to provide the bargained-for letter
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recommending Lopez’s release, and requiring a new hearing in front of the Parole
Board once the letter was received—was an adequate remedy. Lopez contends that
the Parole Board will “always believe[] that the DA did not truly stand behind the
content of the compelled letter,” and a new hearing can therefore never be an
adequate remedy. Lopez, however, does not point to any case law showing that
specific performance under the circumstances of his case is such an unreasonable
remedy that no reasonable jurist could find it adequate. Instead, the Supreme
Court has rejected similar arguments based on the idea that it is “too late to
‘unring’ the bell.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 139 (2009).
Accordingly, it was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, for the Oregon
Court of Appeals to hold that specific performance of Lopez’s agreement with the
Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office was an adequate remedy for the
state’s breach of the plea agreement. Thus, the district court did not err in denying
Lopez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
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