IAND U, INC., a California Corporation v. Publishers Solutions International

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
I AND U, INC., a California Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PUBLISHERS SOLUTIONS
INTERNATIONAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-56473
D.C. No.
2:13-cv-00018-GAF-AJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 8, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, GOULD, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
I and U, Inc. (“I&U”) appeals a district court order granting a special motion
to dismiss filed by Publishers Solutions International (“PSI”) under the California
anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, to strike I&U’s trade libel claim.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
JUN 17 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar,
611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010), and affirm.
1. After an investigation revealed what PSI believed to be the submission
of fraudulent subscriptions by I&U to PSI’s publisher clients, PSI sent I&U a letter
demanding, on the clients’ behalf, that I&U pay $100,000 to resolve the issue.
“Ordinarily, a demand letter sent in anticipation of litigation is a legitimate speech
or petitioning activity that is protected under section 425.16.” Malin v. Singer, 159
Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 299 (Ct. App. 2013). PSI’s demand included a reservation of the
publishers’ legal rights, indicating that potential litigation was more than “a mere
possibility” and was “contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.”
Rohde v. Wolf, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348, 354 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Edwards v. Centex
Real Estate Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 528 (Ct. App. 1997)). PSI’s
communications were therefore protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as pre-
litigation petitioning activity. Cabral v. Martin, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 404 (Ct. App.
2009).
2. California’s litigation privilege, Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b), “is not limited
to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken
prior thereto.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 719 (Cal. 2006). We conclude
that PSI’s demand letter was protected under the privilege. See Briggs v. Eden
Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 569 (Cal. 1999). Thus, I&U cannot

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establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its trade libel claim, which is
premised on PSI’s investigation of the publishers’ claims and the statements in the
demand letter.
AFFIRMED.

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