United States of America v. Gregory Bryan Rush, a.k.a. Gregory B. Rush

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY BRYAN RUSH, a.k.a.
Gregory B. Rush,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-50131
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00607-PA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 26, 2016**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Gregory Bryan Rush appeals the district court’s denial of his request to
modify a condition of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
APR 29 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Rush contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying the
parties’ joint request to modify his residency restriction, which prohibits him from
residing within 2000 feet of certain places primarily used by children, to allow him
to live in a transitional housing facility provided by the Volunteers of America. As
an initial matter, we reject the government’s contention that the district court
lacked authority to modify Rush’s residency restriction. See United States v.
Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (a sentencing court may modify a
condition of supervised release after consideration of the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors). However, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by declining to do so. See United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d
1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). The record shows that the court denied the request
after carefully considering the location of the transitional housing facility, its close
proximity to two elementary schools, the demographics of the surrounding
neighborhood, the number of registered sex offenders living in the area, and
Rush’s prospects of being placed in an alternative transitional housing facility.
Thus, we conclude that the court’s denial of the requested modification involved
no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to protect the public
and promote Rush’s rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
AFFIRMED.
15-50131 2

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