MANUEL SANCHEZ GOMEZ, AKA Sergio E. Meza v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

13-74028Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit29 de abr. de 2016

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL SANCHEZ GOMEZ, AKA
Sergio E. Meza,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-74028
Agency No. A077-197-850
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Immigration Judge’s Decision
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,** Senior District
Judge.
Manuel Sanchez-Gomez appeals the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) determination
under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution
or torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, see Villa-Anguiano v.
FILED
APR 29 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 2013); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955,
958 (9th Cir. 2012), and review the IJ’s factual determinations for substantial
evidence, see Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, — F.3d — (9th Cir. 2016).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez failed
to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution on account of a protected
ground, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c), because the evidence demonstrates that the
kidnappers targeted Sanchez-Gomez based on his perceived wealth, which “will
not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the [INA],” In re S-V-,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1310 (B.I.A. 2000).
Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez
failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture “inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). No evidence
here demonstrates that a government official had “awareness of [torturous] activity
and thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such
activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7). Evidence that a government has been generally
ineffective in investigating or preventing crime does not suffice to show
acquiescence. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2013).
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We also deny Sanchez-Gomez’s motion for judicial notice of newspaper
articles that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d
955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
PETITION DENIED.
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