Jose Felipe Velasco v. KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE FELIPE VELASCO,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 14-55839
D.C. No. 8:12-cv-01011-JSL-AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
J. Spencer Letts, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jose Felipe Velasco appeals the denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. We affirm. Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) govern. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Under
FILED
MAR 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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AEDPA, habeas relief may be granted only if the state court’s adjudication was:
(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2)
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The California Court of Appeal did not err in rejecting Velasco’s claims of
juror bias and affirming his conviction and sentence. The state trial court engaged
in a lengthy colloquy with Juror 112 after she admitted remembering that a former
coworker committed a similar crime to Velasco’s and expressed doubts about her
ability to remain impartial. Although Juror 112 made several troubling statements
during that colloquy, she also expressed confidence that she could follow the
court’s instructions and consider only admissible evidence when returning a
verdict. Given that trial courts are “best situated to determine competency to serve
impartially,” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 (1984), it was not unreasonable
for the state court to find that Juror 112 was believable when she promised to
adhere to the judge’s instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Nor was the state
court’s decision “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” the Supreme
Court’s decisions on juror bias. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036-40; Skilling v. United
2

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States, 561 U.S. 358, 396-99 (2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Thus,
Velasco's claim fails under both prongs of § 2254.
AFFIRMED.
3

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Velasco v. Allison, No. 14-55839
Pregerson, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The “several troubling statements” Juror 112 uttered during the
lengthy colloquy with the court, in my view, would compel any fair-minded jurist
to find actual bias, a determination that would have required the juror’s
replacement by one of the three sitting alternates.
FILED
MAR 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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