Leonard Jacob Boyd v. D. Schmidt;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEONARD JACOB BOYD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
D. SCHMIDT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-35441
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00564-CL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Owen M. Panner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Leonard Jacob Boyd appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal
and state law violations arising out of his arrest and detention. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
FILED
JAN 28 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d
639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Boyd’s action
because Boyd failed to comply with the district court orders instructing him to
respond to defendants’ interrogatories. See id. at 642-43 (discussing the five
factors for determining whether to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to
comply with a court order); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.
1992) (although dismissal is a harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should
not be disturbed absent “a definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear
error of judgment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Boyd’s action for failure
to comply with court orders, we do not consider Boyd’s challenges to the district
court’s interlocutory orders. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after a final judgment, are
not appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the failure to
prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation and
internal question marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
14-35441 2

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