Chan Saeteurn v. DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHAN SAETEURN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 15-15126
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02043-TJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 4, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges and HUFF,*** District
Judge.
FILED
JAN 06 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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Chan Saeteurn collaterally challenges his conviction and sentence following
his plea of “no contest” to second-degree murder, arguing that the entry of such
plea violated due process. Specifically, he contends that his plea was not entered
knowingly and voluntarily because it resulted from an “emotional response” to
coercive actions by his father and because, at his change-of-plea hearing, the
presiding judge misstated the technical length of the mandatory term of parole he
will face if he is released from prison.
To succeed, Saeteurn must demonstrate that California’s denial of his claims
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(emphasis added). But he fails to refer this court to a single case in which the
Supreme Court has clearly established the underpinnings of either of his two
claims.
First, Saeteurn relies on Supreme Court cases involving coercive conduct of
governmental actors, and does not cite any case in which the Court has held that
such acts from private third-parties unconnected to the criminal justice system may
render a plea unconstitutional. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)
(“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is
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not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
Second, he argues that he was entitled to be fully aware of the “direct
consequences” of his plea, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970),
but he cites no Supreme Court case clearly establishing that the length of a term of
parole is such a consequence. Cf. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 630 (1982)
(assuming without deciding that failure to advise defendants of mandatory term of
parole violated due process). Further, Saeteurn was informed of the correct
mandatory parole term at his sentencing hearing and failed to object.
Saeteurn attempts to bridge the gap between Supreme Court precedent and
his claims by relying on decisions of our own circuit. This is not enough to grant
relief under AEDPA. See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (per curiam);
Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 3–4 (2014) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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