Miguel Angel Mendoza Leon v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL ANGEL MENDOZA LEON,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-74154
Agency No. A200-623-243
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Miguel Angel Mendoza Leon, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence
FILED
NOV 25 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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the agency’s continuous physical presence determination. Serrano Gutierrez v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Mendoza
Leon’s voluntary return to Mexico interrupted his period of continuous physical
presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d
614, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2006) (in order to interrupt the accumulation of continuous
physical presence, the decision to accept voluntary return in lieu of a hearing
before an immigration judge must be knowing and voluntary). Mendoza Leon
does not dispute that he signed a voluntary return form that stated he was giving up
the right to a hearing before an immigration judge, the record indicates that he was
informed of his rights pursuant to the voluntary return form, including his right to
appear before an immigration judge, and he provided inconsistent testimony as to
whether he had been informed of his right to appear before an immigration judge.
Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that Mendoza Leon’s
decision to accept voluntary return was not knowing and voluntary. See Zarate v.
Holder, 671 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Under the substantial evidence
standard, a petitioner can obtain reversal only if the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” (internal citation omitted)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
13-74154 2

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