Manse Sullivan v. PAM AHLIN, Executive Director;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANSE SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PAM AHLIN, Executive Director; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-16245
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00306-GSA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted June 22, 2015***
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
California civil detainee Manse Sullivan appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his civil confinement
as a sexually violent predator under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** Sullivan consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUL 1 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 14-16245
(“SVPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Huftile
v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sullivan’s action because Sullivan
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the SVPA’s post-commitment
procedures deprived him of due process. See Portman v. County of Santa Clara,
995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (elements of a § 1983 procedural due process
claim); see also Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a) (“A person who has been
committed as a sexually violent predator shall be permitted to petition the court for
conditional release with or without the recommendation or concurrence of the
Director of State Hospitals.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997)
(rejecting due process challenge in sexually violent predator context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend after
concluding that amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless amendment would be
futile).
We do not consider Sullivan’s contention regarding the Ex Post Facto clause

-- 2 of 3 --

3 14-16245
because it was not raised below. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2
(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Sullivan’s request for judicial notice, filed on May 1, 2015, is granted.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --