United States of America v. Jared Thomas Bowers

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JARED THOMAS BOWERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-30304
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00034-RRB-2
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS MEJIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-30305
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-00034-RRB-1
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 12, 2015
Anchorage, Alaska
FILED
JUN 01 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Before: CANBY, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. The government introduced sufficient evidence to support Bowers’ and
Mejia’s convictions for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute,
attempted possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and use of a firearm in
connection with a drug trafficking offense.
With respect to the conspiracy charge, the evidence presented at trial proved
more than mere buyer-seller relationships among the key players. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the government, the evidence linked Bowers to the
telephone number that Marmolejos called whenever he had questions about a sale.
Bowers drove Marmolejos to at least one drug deal; after a second, Marmolejos
went to Bowers’ home; and after a third, Marmolejos went to a restaurant where
Bowers’ car was parked. A reasonable jury could have inferred that Bowers was
not merely selling to Marmolejos but instead was directing Marmolejos’ activities.
As for Mejia, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Marmolejos’ statements
about Mejia as a possible source, the 161 calls from Mejia to a telephone number
associated with Bowers, and Mejia’s facilitation of a large drug deal with Bowers
and a third party showed that the three participants were co-conspirators, not
merely associates.

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The government also presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
convict both defendants of the attempt charge. Bowers and Mejia were arrested
shortly after arriving at the location of a pre-arranged drug deal with close to
enough cash on hand to consummate the deal.
Finally, the government presented sufficient evidence to convict both
Bowers and Mejia of the firearm offense. A reasonable jury could have found that
either Bowers or Mejia possessed the gun found in the car and that the other was
responsible through principles of Pinkerton liability. See United States v. Fonseca-
Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
2. The jury instructions given at trial adequately covered the defense’s
theory of the case. A multiple conspiracies instruction was not warranted, as the
actions of the conspirators in evidence could be traced to an overall agreement
among them. See United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1248 n.34 (9th Cir.
2004). The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
standard conspiracy instruction, modified to specify that the co-conspirators must
have intended to distribute “to another,” sufficed to clarify that a buyer-seller
relationship was insufficient.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Marmolejos’
statements through Officer Peronto’s testimony. As detailed above, the

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government presented sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy among
Bowers, Mejia, and Marmolejos. Marmolejos’ statements were made during the
course of the conspiracy, and Mejia’s arrest occurring before some of those
statements were made does not change that fact. See United States v. Taylor, 802
F.2d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that Marmolejos’ statements furthered the conspiracy. For example, the
statements made on February 26, 2013, could have helped Marmolejos win
Peronto’s confidence in order to complete another drug deal.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a
mistrial after Peronto testified that a digital scale had been found on Bowers. The
prosecution withdrew the offending testimony immediately, and the district court
gave a forceful curative instruction. The jury heard extensive evidence linking
Bowers to the drug trade, including the fact that Bowers was arrested shortly
before consummating a major drug deal with a gun and tens of thousands of dollars
in cash. The testimony about the digital scale did not impermissibly taint the entire
trial.
5. We also reject Bowers’ challenges to his sentence. The district court did
not clearly err in giving Bowers a two-level leadership enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), as the evidence presented at trial suggested that Bowers

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directed Marmolejos’ activities. The evidence also supported attributing at least
550 grams of heroin to Bowers—the amount sold to Peronto by Marmolejos and
the amount Mejia and Bowers had arranged to buy from the confidential source.
Any error in attributing the remaining drug quantities to Bowers was harmless. See
United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). Bowers’ sentence of 84 months on the drug offenses would have been a
downward departure even under a Guidelines calculation that excluded those
quantities, see U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table) (2013), and the district
court explained the chosen sentence adequately, noting that he was giving Bowers
a sentence that was “just punishment considering the totality of the circumstances”
as well as “sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing
goals.”
AFFIRMED.

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