Sharon Bencic v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARON BENCIC,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-15295
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00627-NVW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 16, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, ** Judge.
Appellant Sharon Bencic appeals the denial of her claim for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. The ALJ concluded that Bencic suffered from
two severe impairments, but could perform “light work,” including her previous work as a
FILED
MAY 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.

-- 1 of 2 --

waitress. On appeal, Bencic argues that the ALJ erred in weighing her physicians’
medical opinions.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. The ALJ did not err
in giving more weight to the opinions of non-examining and non-treating physicians over
the opinion of treating physician Dr. Hurley. The ALJ gave “specific and legitimate”
reasons for giving less weight to Dr. Hurley’s opinion, including that it was inconsistent
with the opinion of three spine specialists, and with Dr. Hurley’s own conservative course
of treatment. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995). These reasons
were supported by substantial evidence in the record. See id. Despite Bencic’s arguments
to the contrary, the ALJ could rely on the opinions of examining and non-examining
physicians to discount Dr. Hurley’s opinion to the extent these opinions were supported by
and consistent with the objective medical evidence. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).
Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Bencic was not
disabled at step four, we do not reach Bencic’s argument that the ALJ erred at step five.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (“If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a
step, we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step.”).
AFFIRMED.
2

-- 2 of 2 --