Scott Njos v. NORWOOD, CEO, Victorville Complex Warden;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SCOTT NJOS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NORWOOD, CEO, Victorville Complex
Warden; et al.,
Defendants,
And
BOURN, USP Victorville, Captain; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-57273
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01265-GAF-
PLA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2014**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAR 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Federal prisoner Scott Njos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging numerous
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a dismissal for failure to exhaust and for clear error any underlying
factual findings. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Njos’s action without prejudice
because Njos failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 90, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and
requires adherence to deadlines and administrative procedural rules); see also
Sapp, 623 F.3d at 821 (“In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, a
court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not clearly err in
finding that Njos failed to pursue all levels of administrative grievances available
to him. Cf. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822-23 (exhaustion is not required where
administrative remedies are rendered “effectively unavailable”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Njos’s motions for
appointment of counsel because Njos failed to demonstrate exceptional
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circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and explaining “exceptional circumstances” requirement).
Njos’s contention that the district court denied him a fair opportunity to be
heard is unsupported by the record. His contentions concerning his motion for
leave to file an amended complaint are also unpersuasive.
Njos’s motions requesting a ruling, filed on December 5, 2013, and
February 19, 2014, are denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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