Jagir Singh v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAGIR SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 10-71242
Agency No. A098-530-249
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 16, 2014 **
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Jagir Singh petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
FILED
JAN 30 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Singh was not
credible. Morgan v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically,
the BIA found it implausible that (1) Singh did not know why his former employer
was arrested, even though the police allegedly became interested in him because of
that arrest, and (2) Singh learned from his father only ten days before the hearing
that the police accused him of ties to militants, even though he admitted to regular
contact with his father since leaving India. These implausibilities go to the heart of
Singh’s asylum claim. Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Under our case law, testimony that is implausible in light of the background
evidence can support an adverse credibility finding.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). The BIA’s implausibility determination is supported by the
background evidence, see Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2007), and
nothing in the record compels a contrary conclusion. See Morgan, 529 F.3d at
1206 (stating that under the substantial evidence standard, we may reverse an
adverse credibility determination only if a reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to reach a contrary conclusion).
2. Further, even assuming that Singh was credible, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s alternative finding that he failed to establish past persecution.
Singh conceded that he was never arrested or harmed by the Indian police.
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Moreover, Singh failed to demonstrate that the threats made by the police were “so
menacing as to cause significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’” Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d
929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Singh failed to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. The record evidence does not
compel the conclusion that Singh’s fear was objectively reasonable. See Ahmed v.
Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The objective component can be
established . . . by adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of
facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). As the BIA noted, Singh’s employer, whose arrest purportedly
had caused the police to focus on Singh in the first instance, had returned to
government service as a cabinet-level minister by the time of Singh’s removal
hearing.
3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Singh was ineligible
for withholding of removal. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (holding that failure to satisfy the lesser standard of proof required to
establish eligibility for asylum necessarily results in failure to satisfy the “clear
probability” standard for withholding of removal).
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4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Singh was ineligible
for CAT relief. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh
failed to present any evidence that would compel the conclusion “that he would
most likely be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a government official or
other person acting in an official capacity” upon his removal. Id.
PETITION DENIED.
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