Marlon Blacher v. R. DIAZ, Chief Deputy Warden at CSP- Corcoran

12-17419Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 de out. de 2013

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This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Blacher consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28**
U.S.C. § 636(c).
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLON BLACHER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
R. DIAZ, Chief Deputy Warden at CSP-
Corcoran,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-17419
D.C. No. 1:11-cv-01993-SKO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Sheila K. Oberto, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 24, 2013***
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Marlon Blacher appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendant R.
FILED
OCT 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Diaz violated his constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.
2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We
may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s claim challenging the
prison’s grievance procedures because “[t]here is no legitimate claim of
entitlement to a grievance procedure.” Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
Cir. 1988); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-88 (1995) (prison
regulations do not provide a state-created liberty interest unless they impose an
“atypical, significant deprivation” in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life).
Dismissal of Blacher’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Blacher
failed to allege facts demonstrating defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged denial of access to the prison law library or a causal connection between
defendant’s conduct and the alleged violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under
§ 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

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constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” (citation
omitted)).
The district court did not err when it dismissed without prejudice for
improper venue Blacher’s claims added in his amended complaint. Venue was not
proper in the Eastern District of California because the events giving rise to those
claims occurred in the Central District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(listing grounds for venue and explaining that a civil action should be brought in
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim
occurred).
AFFIRMED.

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