Michael B. Williams v. DEBBIE PHILIPS, Patient’s Trust Officer at Coalinga State Hospital; PAM AHLIN

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Williams consented in writing to proceed before a magistrate judge.**
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Defendants’ consent is inferred from its conduct during
litigation. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003).
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DEBBIE PHILIPS, Patient’s Trust Officer
at Coalinga State Hospital; PAM AHLIN,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-15956
D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00456-GBC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Gerald B. Cohn, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 24, 2013***
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Michael B. Williams, a civil detainee confined at Coalinga State Hospital
FILED
AUG 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a
withdrawal of funds from his patient trust account violated his federal
constitutional rights and the no-contest clause of his father’s will. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
state a claim, Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005), and we
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s equal protection claim
because Williams failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants intentionally
and without rational basis treated him differently from others similarly situated and
intentionally discriminated against him. See N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica,
526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (elements of equal protection claim).
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s due process claim because
the Notice of Intended Withdrawal and denial of Williams’s appeal, included as
exhibits to the First Amended Complaint, showed that Williams received all of the
process that he was due. See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1554 (9th Cir. 1988)
(due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard).
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s takings claim because
Williams failed to allege facts demonstrating that his funds were taken for public

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use. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 7281 (sums exceeding $500 in a patient’s
personal deposit fund “may be applied to the payment of the care, support,
maintenance, and medical attention of the patient”); Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807,
810 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements of a takings claim).
The district court properly dismissed Williams’s state law claim alleging that
defendants violated the “no-contest” provision of his father’s will because the
defendants were not beneficiaries of the will. See Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92,
103 (Cal. 1994) (no contest clause “essentially acts as a disinheritance device, i.e.,
if a beneficiary contests or seeks to impair or invalidate the trust instrument or its
provisions, the beneficiary will be disinherited and thus may not take the gift or
devise provided under the instrument”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Gordon v. City of
Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review).
We do not consider Williams’s contentions concerning an alleged violation
of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution raised for the first time
on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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