United States of America v. Kaleena Leah Morales

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KALEENA LEAH MORALES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-10069
D.C. No. 4:11-cr-02782-CKJ-
HCE-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 13, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Kaleena Leah Morales appeals her convictions for one count of conspiracy
to transport aliens who unlawfully came to or entered the United States, see 8
U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (a)(1)(A)(ii) & (a)(1)(B)(i), and three counts of
FILED
JUL 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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In an opinion filed concurrently with this memorandum disposition, we1
address Morales’s evidentiary claims and affirm her conviction.
2
transporting those aliens, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) & (a)(1)(B)(i), in each
case for private financial gain. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1
The district court did not err in denying Morales’s motion to suppress.
Officer Kroeger’s decision to stop Morales was based on his observations that her
truck was traveling below the average speed of traffic and that her windshield was
cracked. These observations were sufficient to form a reasonable basis to suspect
that Morales was violating Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 28-721(B) and 28-957.01.
See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore,
the investigatory stop of her vehicle was constitutional and suppression was not
required.
The district court did not clearly err in denying Morales a downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The court
correctly acknowledged that Morales was still eligible for the adjustment despite
having gone to trial, see United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 941–42
(9th Cir. 2013), but nonetheless concluded that she had not met her burden of
demonstrating acceptance of responsibility based on her pre-trial statements and
conduct. This conclusion was supported by the record, which does not provide any

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3
indication that she accepted responsibility until she appeared at sentencing. See
United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.

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