11-35387•MICHAEL ANTHONY GUMMO, AKA Michael Chiofar, AKA Michael Anthony Gummo Bear v. PIERCE COUNTY, All its agents and Employees;
11-35387Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit20 de jun. de 2013
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL ANTHONY GUMMO, AKA
Michael Chiofar, AKA Michael Anthony
Gummo Bear,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY, All its agents and
Employees; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35387
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05227-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 18, 2013**
Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Michael Anthony Gummo, aka Michael Chiofar, aka Michael Anthony
Gummo Bear, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil rights
FILED
JUN 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th
Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gummo’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
against defendants City of Seattle, King County, and Pierce County because
Gummo failed to allege facts demonstrating that any alleged federal constitutional
violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen
v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
requirements for municipal liability under § 1983).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gummo’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Gummo failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gummo’s motions
for reconsideration because Gummo failed to establish any ground for such relief.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for
reconsideration).
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Gummo’s contentions concerning the guardian ad litem appointed by the
district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and alleged violations of due process are
unpersuasive.
We do not consider arguments concerning claims that were not included in
Gummo’s complaint, including the negligence claims. See Dream Palace v.
County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the reasoning
for not considering arguments that were not raised before the district court).
AFFIRMED.
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