Arthur Charles Gallegos v. State of Arizona

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
**
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR CHARLES GALLEGOS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-15322
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01877-MHM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Mary H. Murguia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2013**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Arthur Charles Gallegos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a Second Amendment claim
arising out of the the Arizona Court of Appeals’s denial of his request as a
FILED
FEB 19 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

10-15322 2
convicted felon to restore his right to bear arms. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal of an action under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003), and for an
abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for leave to amend, Chodos v. West
Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gallegos’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it amounted to a
forbidden “de facto appeal” of a state court judgment and raised a constitutional
claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment. See Noel,
341 F.3d at 1163-65; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman bars “state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced” from asking federal courts to review those judgments).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gallegos leave to
file a second amended complaint because, even if Gallegos could explain how his
proposed amended complaint differed from his operative complaint, amendment
would have been futile. See Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003 (dismissal without leave to
amend is proper where the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment); see also
Thinket Ink Info Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.

-- 2 of 3 --

10-15322 3
2004) (discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” where plaintiff has
previously filed an amended complaint).
Gallegos’s contentions regarding the alleged violations of his rights in
various state court criminal, habeas, and special actions are unpersuasive.
Gallegos’s motion for relief with respect to a pending special action in
Arizona state court is denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --