Maikal Ali Iskandar Halim v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAIKAL ALI ISKANDAR HALIM,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 11-70759
Agency No. A075-745-174
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 3, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, Senior Circuit Judge, McKEOWN and TALLMAN,
Circuit Judges.
Maikal Halim, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen his
removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review
FILED
DEC 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Feng Gui Lin v.
Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Halim failed to
establish an individualized risk of persecution in light of this court’s decision in
Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). Halim’s argument that the
BIA applied the higher withholding of removal standard to his asylum claim fails
because the BIA was merely explaining the holding in Tampubolon, in which that
petitioner was time-barred from seeking asylum. See Tampubolon, 610 F.3d at
1059. In applying the correct standard, the BIA did not err in determining that,
even as a member of a disfavored group, Halim failed to demonstrate sufficient
individualized risk of future persecution in Indonesia. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558
F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that in the asylum context, “some evidence
of individualized risk is necessary for the petitioner to succeed”). The evidence
Halim proffered—that he is an active member of his church in the United States
and that he suffered abuse as a youth—is insufficient to distinguish his risk of
persecution from the generalized risk felt by all Christians in Indonesia. See
Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007).
Next, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Halim failed to
establish materially changed country conditions. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597

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F.3d 983, 991(2010). The news articles and reports Halim submitted in support of
his motion to reopen are not “qualitatively different” from the evidence of the
difficult conditions for Christians he proffered in his initial application for asylum.
See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 946-47 (2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A
motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven . . . if the
motion is granted.”) (emphasis added). Although the BIA “did not directly
reference” any of the articles or reports Halim submitted, “there is nothing to
suggest it did not consider that evidence in deciding that” Halim failed to establish
changed conditions in Indonesia. Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991; see also Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [BIA] does not have to
write an exegesis on every contention.”).
Finally, the BIA did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law, by
declining to take into account evidence of Halim’s child’s developmental
disabilities, when that evidence went neither to changed country conditions nor to
Halim's individualized fear of future persecution.
PETITION DENIED.

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